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Abstract 
We find evidence that crowdsourced investment research facilitates informed trading by retail 
investors and improves firm liquidity. Specifically, retail order imbalances are strongly correlated 
with the sentiment of Seeking Alpha articles, and the ability of retail order imbalances to predict 
returns is roughly twice as large on research article days. In addition, firms with exogenous 
reductions in Seeking Alpha coverage experience increases in bid-ask spreads and price impact, 
with the effect being stronger for firms with high retail ownership. Our findings suggest that 
technological innovations have helped democratize access to investment research with important 
implications for firm liquidity. 
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1. Introduction 
Information is a key ingredient for well-functioning financial markets. Without a broad 
base of investors with access to accurate information, pricing securities becomes difficult and 
markets can stagnate. At the same time, information with high investment value tends to be costly 
to produce, which has left individuals at a perennial disadvantage relative to institutional investors. 
In recent decades, improvements in technology have significantly reduced the cost of gathering 
and sharing investment information, and these developments have been lauded for their potential 
to help level the informational playing field.1 
In this article, we examine the extent to which an important technology-enabled innovation, 
crowdsourced investment research, has led to improved individual investor decision-making and 
enhanced market liquidity. Few finance media sites exemplify the democratization of investment 
research better than Seeking Alpha (SA). Seeking Alpha attracts millions of visitors each month 
by providing curated investment research from thousands of individual research contributors.2 The 
value of Seeking Alpha’s investor-authored research is well documented. For example, Chen, et 
al. (2014) find that Seeking Alpha research articles predict future stock returns and earnings 
surprises. In our analysis, we examine whether individual investors benefit from Seeking Alpha 
research. 
Individual investors have been traditionally viewed as unsophisticated “noise” traders who 
tend to spend less time on investment analysis, use different information sources from their 
professional counterparts, and underperform standard benchmarks (e.g., Kumar and Lee, 2006; 
                                                            
1 For example, early in the internet era SEC Commissioner Laura Unger anticipated technology’s potential and 
concluded a speech with “It looks as though investors stand to benefit greatly from the Information Revolution. The 
Internet has powered the revolution. It's also been a key element in the push for democratization of the flow of 
investment information.” (June 2000) https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm 
2 https://seekingalpha.com/page/about_us 
2 
 
Barber and Odean, 2013 review the literature). In recent years, however, studies have uncovered 
evidence of informed trading by individuals, with retail order flow predicting stock returns and 
future earnings announcement surprises (Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 2008; Kaniel et al., 2012; 
Kelley and Tetlock, 2013, 2017; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2017). Although the improved 
performance of individual investors over time could be associated with learning or changing 
demographics, a key driver that remains unexplored is better access to investment research. 
We begin by documenting that Seeking Alpha’s crowdsourced investor-authored research 
is distinct from traditional Wall Street brokerage research. We analyze over 140,000 research 
articles for 4,000 stocks and find that after controlling for other firm characteristics, Seeking Alpha 
coverage (number of articles) is higher among firms with low institutional ownership and greater 
breadth of ownership, whereas the opposite is true for brokerage research coverage. The 
differences highlight Seeking Alpha’s emphasis on retail investor oriented research. 
We find strong evidence that individual investors react to Seeking Alpha research. Using 
trade and quote data from NYSE TAQ and the method of Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017) to 
identify retail investor trades, we find a significant increase in retail trading on days with Seeking 
Alpha articles. Individuals also account for a greater fraction of overall trading volume on article 
days, suggesting that individuals react to Seeking Alpha research more than institutional investors 
do. In addition, we find that retail order imbalances are strongly correlated with the sentiment of 
Seeking Alpha research articles, with individual investors in aggregate being more likely to 
purchase (sell) stock following positive (negative) articles. 
More importantly, we find robust evidence that access to crowdsourced research enhances 
the profitability of retail investor trades. In particular, the relation between retail order flow and 
future stock returns is roughly twice as strong on days with Seeking Alpha research articles. For 
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example, a one standard deviation increase in daily retail order imbalance is associated with future 
ten-day returns that are 0.09% larger on average, and yet this return differential increases to 0.18% 
on days with Seeking Alpha articles and to 0.34% on days with articles written by high-skill 
research contributors. We find no evidence of a return reversal, which is consistent with individual 
investors becoming informed through their access to crowdsourced research.  
We benchmark retail investor behavior on days with Seeking Alpha articles against their 
behavior on days with brokerage research. Although retail investors may have access to consensus 
recommendations or forecasts, their access to detailed reports and to the analysts themselves is 
less extensive than institutional investors. Accordingly, we find weaker evidence of increased 
retail trading around days with brokerage research revisions. Moreover, we find no evidence that 
retail investors trade profitably around brokerage research revision days, indicating the limited 
value of brokerage research to retail investors and highlighting the distinctiveness of crowdsourced 
investment research. We also find no evidence that retail investors trade more profitably following 
stock-focused media articles, further underscoring the investment value of Seeking Alpha. 
Notably, we find the opposite pattern when examining how institutional investors trade 
following these events. In particular, we find that institutional order flow is more informed 
following brokerage research and media articles, consistent with superior access to sell-side 
research and a greater capacity for processing public information. On the other hand, we do not 
observe that institutional order flow is more informative following Seeking Alpha articles, 
suggesting that crowdsourced investment research provides unique information benefits to retail 
investors. 
We next we explore the broader implications of crowdsourced research for the firm’s 
information environment. We hypothesize that Seeking Alpha research reduces information 
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asymmetry among investors by decreasing the information advantage of institutional investors 
over retail investors, and we test whether the reduction in information asymmetry is significant 
enough to translate into improved liquidity for the firm. Our empirical strategy is to identify 
plausibly exogenous shocks to Seeking Alpha coverage (similar to Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). 
Specifically, we contend that when an individual contributor departs from the platform altogether, 
the resulting decline in Seeking Alpha coverage is exogenous, i.e. driven by a change in the 
contributor’s personal circumstances rather than an expectation of a change in the firm’s 
information environment. Consistent with the view that Seeking Alpha contributor departures are 
exogenous events, we find no evidence that firms that experience departures also experience 
reductions in coverage by non-departing Seeking Alpha contributors, brokerage firms, or the 
media. 
We estimate the effects of an exogenous reduction in Seeking Alpha coverage on firm-
level measures of liquidity in the year following the event using a difference-in-difference 
approach. Specifically, we define a firm as having experienced contributor departure when 20% 
or more of the firm’s contributors depart Seeking Alpha in a given year, and we match each treated 
firm to control firms that are in the same size and book-to-market quintiles and experience no 
contributor departure. We find that bid-ask spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure 
increase by 2.4% and 5.5%, respectively, for contributor-departure firms relative to control firms, 
which is consistent with the idea that reduced Seeking Alpha coverage results in lower liquidity. 
The effects of contributor departures on liquidity are stronger among small firms, those with 
greater retail ownership, and when the departing contributors possess greater skill.  
Our study contributes to a nascent but fast-growing literature on the role of crowdsourced 
research in capital markets. We extend early studies that document the role of crowdsourced 
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research in predicting future returns and earnings (Chen et al., 2014; Jame et al., 2016; Avery, 
Chevalier, and Zeckhauser, 2016) by documenting its role as a source of information specifically 
for retail investors. Our findings that Seeking Alpha research encourages retail investor 
participation and helps retail investors become more informed are consistent with crowdsourced 
research levelling the informational playing field between institutional and retail investors.  
Our analysis also adds to the literature that studies the performance of retail investors. Early 
studies find the trading performance of retail investors to be subpar due to behavioral biases, lack 
of sophistication, and poor access to information with high investment value (e.g., Barber and 
Odean, 2000, Kumar and Lee, 2006; Frazzini and Lamont, 2008; Hvidkjaer, 2008; Barber, Odean, 
and Zhu, 2009). On the other hand, more recent work finds that retail investors as a group exhibit 
stock picking ability and speculate that retail investors have valuable information gleaned from 
geographic proximity to firms, relations with employees, or insights into customer tastes (e.g. 
Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman, 2012; Kelly and Tetlock, 2013, 2017; and Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang, 2017). Our study is distinguished by its focus on how retail investors become informed. 
We present results that link retail investors’ trading performance to the availability of retail-
oriented investment research and question the view that retail investors make investment decisions 
without requisite investment analysis. 
A third stream of literature examines the use of technology by regulators to level the 
informational playing field between institutional investors and retail investors.3 We complement 
these studies by examining the extent to which a technology-enabled market innovation, Seeking 
                                                            
3 Examples are the launch of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) in 1993 
(Asthana, Balsam, and Sankaraguruswamy, 2004; Gao and Huang, 2017), Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 
(Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman, 2004; Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young, 2008), and the mandated use 
of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) in corporate filing in 2009 (Blankespoor, Miller, and White, 
2014; Bhattacharya, Cho, and Kim, 2018).  
6 
 
Alpha, has democratized the flow of investment information. Our findings illustrate how 
technological change can enable new business models which improve retail investors’ access to 
information and level the informational playing field among investors.  
2. The Seeking Alpha Sample 
Seeking Alpha (SA) is one of the largest investment-related social media websites in the 
US. In 2017, the site had more than 39 million monthly visits, with the average visit lasting roughly 
20 minutes (Seeking Alpha, 2018). The website relies on a contributor network of over 15,000 
individuals to publish opinion articles. Contributor testimonials suggests that some of the primary 
motivations for contributing articles include direct compensation from Seeking Alpha, feedback 
(via reader comments) on investment theses, and increased recognition and visibility which may 
lead to other professional opportunities.4 Chen, et al. (2014) find that Seeking Alpha’s 
crowdsourced investment research contains valuable information, with articles and user 
commentaries predicting future stock returns and earnings surprises. 
We collect all opinion articles published between 2005 and 2017 on the Seeking Alpha 
website. For each article, we collect the following information: article ID (assigned by Seeking 
Alpha), title, main text, date of publication, author name, and ticker (or tickers) assigned to each 
article. Following Chen et al., (2014) we limit the sample to articles that are associated with one 
ticker. We further limit the sample to common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) with available data 
in the CRSP-Compustat merged database. Our final sample includes 156,513 single-ticker articles.  
For each firm, we collect data on share price, shares outstanding, stock returns, volume and 
closing bid and ask prices from CRSP. We obtain book value of equity, book value of debt, book 
value of assets, the date of the initial public offering (IPO), earnings before interest taxes 
                                                            
4 See:  https://seekingalpha.com/page/testimonials.  
7 
 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), and total common shareholders from Compustat. We 
collect the number of shares held by institutions from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(S34) database. We obtain earnings announcement dates and sell-side analyst earnings forecast 
from the IBES unadjusted US detail history file, sell-side analyst recommendations from the IBES 
detail recommendation file, and earnings guidance from the IBES detail history guidance file. Data 
on traditional media coverage, defined as Dow Jones News Service articles, were graciously 
provided by Byoung-Hyoun Hwang for the period from 2005 to 2012 (as in Chen et al, 2014), and 
we collect the data for the period from 2012 to 2017. 
Table 1 describes the remarkable increase in the breadth and depth of Seeking Alpha 
coverage over time. From 2005 to 2017, research coverage rose from 240 to 2,217; the number of 
research contributors grew from 38 to 1,995; and the number of research articles increased from 
282 to 19,505. In an average year, 1,208 unique contributors publish 12,039 articles on 1,638 
different companies. Conditional on having Seeking Alpha coverage, the average firm has roughly 
6.6 articles per year, written by 4 different contributors. 
3. Contrasting Seeking Alpha with Traditional Brokerage Research  
In this section, we explore the attributes of Seeking Alpha research in relation to traditional 
Wall Street research. Seeking Alpha’s business model is built on reaching a wide audience of do-
it-yourself investors, and Seeking Alpha contributors are often individual investors. In contrast, 
prior survey evidence and empirical work suggests that brokerage analysts cater to institutional 
investors. For example, Brown et al. (2015) report that more than 80% of surveyed analysts view 
hedge funds and mutual fund clients as very important, while only 13% of these analysts view 
retail clients as important. Consistent with this survey evidence, several papers find that sell-side 
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research is strongly increasing in institutional ownership (see, e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Green et al., 
2014).  
We examine the determinants of Seeking Alpha coverage and sell-side coverage by 
estimating the following panel regression: 
Coverageit =  +β1Institutional Ownrshpi,t-1 +β2Breadth of Ownrshpi,t-1 +βChars +Timet + εit, (1) 
where Coverage is the natural log of 1 plus the total number of unique Seeking Alpha contributors 
writing at least one article for the stock during the calendar year (SA Coverage), or the natural log 
of 1 plus the total number of unique brokerage firms issuing at least one earnings forecast for the 
stock during the calendar year (IBES Coverage). 
The two independent variables of primary interest are Institutional Ownrshpi,t-1, defined as 
the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors in year t-1, and Breadth of 
Ownrshp, defined as the number of common shareholders (both in logs). The vector of firm 
characteristics, Chars, includes: market capitalization (Size), book to market (BM), return volatility 
(Volatility), share turnover (Turnover), past one-year return (Return), past one-year profitability 
(Profitability), and the number of unique media articles mentioning the firm the prior year (Media 
Coverage). See the Appendix for detailed definitions. We log all continuous variables other than 
Profitability and Return, and standardize all variables to have zero mean and unit variance. We 
include year fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm. 
Specification 1 of Table 2 examines the determinants of SA Coverage without controlling 
for IBES Coverage. In general, SA Coverage is higher for larger firms, firms with more frequent 
media coverage, and those with greater trading volume. In addition, SA Coverage is positively 
related to volatility, past one-year returns, and profitability. Consistent with our conjecture that 
Seeking Alpha research is a retail investor rather than an institutional investor phenomenon, we 
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find a strong negative relation between SA Coverage and institutional ownership and a strong 
positive relation between SA Coverage and total common shareholders. In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in Institutional Ownership (Breadth of Ownership) is associated with 
an 18% decline (3% increase) in SA Coverage. These findings are robust to controlling for IBES 
Coverage, which is positively correlated with SA Coverage (Specification 2).  
Specifications 3 and 4 present analogous results for traditional coverage by sell-side 
brokerage firms (IBES Coverage). As expected and in sharp contrast to the SA Coverage patterns, 
IBES Coverage is strongly positively related to institutional ownership and strongly negatively 
related to breadth of ownership. Collectively, these results are consistent with the idea that Seeking 
Alpha tilts their research towards stocks with greater retail ownership and a larger investor base, 
while traditional brokerage research caters to institutional investors. 
4. Do Retail Investors React to Seeking Alpha Research? 
In this section, we examine two related predictions: 1) the dissemination of Seeking Alpha 
research generates disproportionately greater trading among retail investors (Section 4.1), and 2) 
the tone of the Seeking Alpha research article influences retail investor order imbalances (Section 
4.2).  
4.1 Retail Trading Intensity around Seeking Alpha Research  
We identify retail trading using Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang’s (2017) approach, which 
exploits two key institutional features of retail trading. First, most equity trades by retail investors 
take place off-exchange, either filled from the broker’s own inventory or sold by the broker to 
wholesalers (Battalio, Cowin, and Jennings, 2016). TAQ classifies these types of trades with 
exchange code “D.” Accordingly, we identify retail trades by limiting our analysis to trades 
executed on exchange code “D.” 
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Second, retail traders typical receive a small fraction of a cent price improvement over the 
National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO) for market orders (ranging from 0.01 to 0.2 cents), while 
institutional orders tend to be executed at whole or half-cent increments. Thus, we follow 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017) (BJZ) and identify trades as retail purchases (sales) if the trade 
took place at a price just below (above) a round penny.5 The BJZ approach is conservative in the 
sense that it has a low type 1 error (i.e., trades classified as retail are very likely to be retail). While 
this approach does omit some retail trading including nonmarketable limit orders and retail traders 
that take place on registered exchanges, it “picks up a majority of overall retail trading activity” 
(BJZ page 6).6    
We consider two complementary measures of retail trading intensity: Retail Turnoverit, 
which is the total trading volume in stock i on day t classified as retail, scaled by stock i’s shares 
outstanding, and Percentage Retail Turnover, which is the total trading volume in stock i on day t 
classified as retail, scaled by aggregate trading volume for stock i on day t. The turnover measure 
allows us to examine whether retail investors trade more following Seeking Alpha research than 
at other times, whereas the percentage turnover measure considers whether the increase in trading 
following SA research is larger for retail investors than for institutional investors. We estimate the 
effects of Seeking Alpha research on retail investor trading using the following daily panel 
regression: 
Retail Tradingit =  + β1SAit-1,t + β2IBESit-1,t + β3Mediat-1,t + β4Charsiy-1 + Timet + Firmi + εit, (2) 
                                                            
5 This approach focuses on liquidity-demanding retail trading (market orders). Kelley and Tetlock (2013) find that 
while both aggressive and passive retail trading predicts returns, liquidity-demanding trading also predicts earnings 
surprises. 
6 BJZ also note that in a conference discussion of their work, Eric Kelley presented that the correlation between the 
BJZ order imbalance measure and imbalances calculated from Kelley and Tetlock (2013)’s proprietary retail data with 
observed trade directions is in the range of 0.345 to 0.507, with an average of 0.452. 
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where Retail Trading is Retail Turnover or Percentage Retail Turnover, SAit is equal to one if 
Seeking Alpha issued a research report for firm i on day t or t-1,7 and IBES and Media are defined 
similarly. Char includes Size, book-to-market (BM), Institutional Ownership, Volatility, Turnover, 
Return, Profitability, IBES coverage, and Media Coverage, all measured at the end of the previous 
year. Detailed variable descriptions are provided in the Appendix. All continuous independent 
variables are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. Time and Firm indicate time 
(calendar day) and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Our TAQ sample begins in 2007, and we consider all firm-years with Seeking Alpha 
coverage (at least one SA research report). We exclude Seeking Alpha research articles that 
coincide with earnings announcements or earnings guidance to reduce the likelihood that SA 
research is merely proxying for information contained in these information events. The resulting 
2007-2017 sample comprises 3,925,070 firm-day observations.  
Specifications 1 and 3 of Table 3 report the results prior to including firm fixed effects. 
The statistically significant positive coefficient on SAt-1,t in Specification 1 indicates that retail 
investors trade more following Seeking Alpha research than on other days. Moreover, the 
significant positive coefficient in Specification 3 confirms that the increase in trading for retail 
investors is greater than for institutional investors, with retail investors comprising a larger fraction 
of the daily turnover following Seeking Alpha research. The results also hold after including firm 
fixed effects in Specifications 2 and 4. 
Table 3 also provides evidence that trading intensity is greater following the release of 
traditional brokerage research or media coverage, although the economic magnitudes are 
considerably smaller. For example, the coefficient on the SA indicator variable in Specification 3 
                                                            
7 We include day t-1 to account for SA reports published after the close of trading on day t-1. We analyze trading days 
separately in Table 4. 
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(1.31%) is roughly 4 times larger than the coefficient on the IBES indicator (0.34%) and more than 
50% larger than Media (0.69%), and the relative differences become even larger after controlling 
for firm fixed effects.  
4.2 Retail Order Imbalances and Seeking Alpha Research Article Sentiment 
To provide more direct evidence that retail investors read and react to Seeking Alpha 
research, we explore the relation between retail order imbalances and SA research sentiment. We 
consider two sentiment measures. The first is based on article tone: Percent Negativeit (Percent 
Positiveit) is the average fraction of negative (positive) words across all single-ticker articles 
published on Seeking Alpha about company i on day t (Chen et al., 2014). We use the word list 
compiled by Loughran and McDonald (2011) to classify words as negative or positive. The second 
is based on a contributor’s investment position, as disclosed in the article: Short (Long) Positionit 
is one when a contributor discloses short (long) the stock (Campbell et al., 2016).8 When several 
contributors disclose investment positions, we take a simple average. 
For reference, we also examine the relation between retail order imbalances and brokerage 
research and traditional media coverage. We create indicator variables for Long (Short) brokerage 
research, defined as IBES recommendation upgrades (downgrades) or positive (negative) earnings 
forecast revisions. We also calculate the tone of traditional media articles using the Percent 
Negativeit and Percent Positiveit measures, as defined above.  
 For all firm-days with at least one event (i.e., Seeking Alpha article, IBES report, or media 
article) we estimate the following panel regression: 
Retail OIBi,t+x =  + β1 SA + β2 SA×Percent Negativeit + β3 SA×Percent Positiveit   (3) 
+β4 SA×Short Positionit + β5 SA×Long Positionit + β6IBES  
                                                            
8 The site has mandated investment position disclosures since 2015. 
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+β7IBES×Long+ β8IBES×Short + β9Media + β10Media×Percent Negativeit  
+β11Media×Percent Positiveit + β12Inst OIBit + β13Chariy-1 + Timet + εit. 
As in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017), Retail OIBi,t+x is defined as the retail buy volume less 
the retail sell volume, scaled by the total retail trading volume for firm i on day t+x. We define 
day t as the event day (the day the Seeking Alpha article is published) and let x vary from -3 to +3. 
By focusing on a seven-day window around the event, we are able to examine the lead-lag relation 
between Seeking Alpha research and retail investor trading. To control for broad omitted factors 
that affect the order imbalances of all investors, we also include Inst OIB, which is defined as the 
total order imbalance across all TAQ trades less the retail order imbalance.9 Char is a vector of 
firm characteristics (taken from BJZ) and includes past one-week returns (Retw-1), past one month 
returns (Retm-1), returns over the prior two to seven months (Retm-7,m-2), market capitalization (Size), 
monthly turnover (Turnover), monthly volatility of daily returns (Volatility), and book-to-market 
(BM). With the exception of returns, all control variables are measured at the end of the previous 
year and are in natural logs. To control for confounding events, we exclude Seeking Alpha articles 
that coincide with earnings announcements, earnings guidance, or brokerage (IBES) investment 
research (forecast revisions or recommendation changes).  
Table 4 presents the results. We find robust evidence that Seeking Alpha article sentiment 
tone predicts retail order imbalances on event days 0 and +1. For example, a one-standard deviation 
increase in SA Percent Negative Words is associated with a 1.17 % and 1.05% decline in Retail 
OIB on days 0 and 1.10 On these days, the incremental effect of short positions is a decline in Retail 
OIB  of 6.75% and 6.41%, respectively, whereas the incremental effect of long positions is 3.83% 
                                                            
9 Our trade-based classification approach provides an imperfect measure of all retail trading, and therefore calculating 
the total order imbalance less the retail order imbalance also provides an imperfect measure of all institutional trading. 
10 The absence of a relation between Retail OIB and SA Percent Positive Words is consistent with prior evidence that 
negative words are better at capturing variation in tone (e.g., Tetlock, 2007). 
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and 2.15%. Short position disclosures and negative SA tone continue to have a discernible effect 
on Retail OIB on days +2 and +3. We find no evidence that retail order imbalances on event days 
-3 or -2 predicts the sentiment of future Seeking Alpha articles, although there is some evidence 
that Retail OIB on day -1 is related to negative article tone and the disclosure of short positions. 
We also find that retail investors react to IBES research and media coverage, yet the 
economic magnitudes of these effects are smaller than for Seeking Alpha research. For example, 
while the cumulative effects of SA×Long and SA×Short on Retail OIB in the two days surrounding 
the event are 5.98% and -13.16%, the corresponding estimates for IBES×Long and IBES×Short 
are 4.22% and -1.03%. Moreover, the effect of SA Percent Negative on retail order imbalances in 
the same event window is twice that of Media Percent Negative (-2.22 versus -1.19). 
In summary, our findings thus far indicate that Seeking Alpha research is geared towards 
stocks that are owned by retail investors. Moreover, the publication of SA articles stimulates 
significant trading by retail investors that is directionally consistent with the tone of the article. 
Given the evidence that Seeking Alpha research tone is informative about future stock returns 
(Chen et al., 2014), these findings suggest that Seeking Alpha research may also facilitate more 
informed trading among retail investors. We explore this hypothesis next.  
5. Does Seeking Alpha Research Help Retail Investors Become Better Informed? 
Early work finds evidence that retail trading is at best uninformed, and at worst, a negative 
predictor of future stock returns, and the literature concludes that retail investors are noise traders 
that are influenced by behavioral biases (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2000; Frazzini and Lamont, 2008; 
Hvidkjaer, 2008; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009). In contrast, several more recent studies find 
evidence consistent with retail investors trading being informed (e.g. Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 
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2008; Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman, 2012; Kelly and Tetlock, 2013, 2017; and Boehmer, Jones, 
and Zhang, 2017). 
The improved performance of individual investors over time has been explained with 
learning or changing investor demographics. For example, Barber and Odean (2002) find evidence 
of detrimental overconfidence among early adopters of online trading, and Seru, Shumway, and 
Stoffman (2010) find evidence consistent with consistent with two types of learning: some 
investors get better at trading as they acquire more experience, others stop trading after realizing 
they lack trading skill. We conjecture that better access to investment information may also play a 
role in the increase in informativeness of retail investor trading over time. In this section, we 
explore whether the presence of crowdsourced, retail-oriented investment research influences the 
informativeness of retail investor trading. 
5.1 Retail Order Imbalances and Stock Returns – Baseline Results 
 We examine the informativeness of retail order imbalances on days in which Seeking 
Alpha research is published by estimating the following panel regression: 
 Retit,t+x =  + β1Retail OIBit + β2Inst OIBit + β3SAit  +  β4Retail OIB×SAit  (4) 
+ β5Inst OIBit ×SAit + β6Mediait + β7Retail OIB×Mediait 
+  β8Inst OIB×Mediait + β9IBESit + β10Retail OIB×IBESit 
+  β11Inst OIB×IBESit  + β13Chariy-1 + Timet + εit, 
where Retit+1,t+x  is the return on stock i from the close of day t to the close of day t+x, with x equal 
to 1, 5, or 10; Retail OIB is the total retail buy volume less the total retail sell volume, scaled by 
the total retail trading volume; Inst OIB is the total non-retail buy volume less the total non-retail 
sell volume, scaled by the total non-retail trading volume; and SAit is equal to one if there is a SA 
research article on firm i on day t or t-1, and zero otherwise. Our primary variable of interest, Retail 
OIB×SA, captures the incremental informativeness of retail order imbalance on days with Seeking 
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Alpha research. Institutional OIB×SA captures the incremental informativeness of institutional 
trading on days with Seeking Alpha research. Mediait is equal to one if there is a traditional media 
article for firm i on day t or t-1, and zero otherwise. Similarly constructed, IBESit indicates the 
distribution of sell-side research. Characteristics is the vector of firm characteristic described in 
Equation (3). We exclude firm-days that coincide with earnings announcements or earnings 
guidance and standardize all continuous variables, as in Section 4. We include time fixed effects 
and double cluster standard errors by date (calendar day) and firm. 
 Table 5 presents the results. Consistent with Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017), we find 
that retail order imbalance is a strong positive predictor of future returns. Moreover, we find that 
retail trading is a stronger return predictor on days with Seeking Alpha research. For example, in 
Specification 3, a one standard deviation increase in retail order imbalance is associated with a 
0.09% increase in 10-days returns on days without Seeking Alpha research and an increase of 
0.18% (0.09% +0.09%) on days with Seeking Alpha research. In contrast, the coefficients on Retail 
OIB×Media and Retail OIB×IBES are always economically and statistically insignificant, which 
further highlights the unique role of Seeking Alpha research (relative to traditional media and 
brokerage research) in enhancing the informativeness of retail investor trades. We also find that 
when retail investor trading is more informed, institutional investor trading tends to be less 
informed. Specifically, Institutional OIB is a stronger predictor of future returns on days when 
traditional media articles and sell-side research are distributed but not on days when SA articles 
are published.  
Finally, in Figure 1 we estimate Equation (3) for x=10, 20, and 60 and plot the estimates 
of Retail, Retail OIB×SA, Retail OIB×Media, and Retail OIB×IBES. Consistent with Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang (2017), we find that the informativeness of retail trading is concentrated over 
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relatively short holding periods. In each case, more than 50% of the 60-day returns accrue in the 
first ten days. The patterns are similar but economically smaller for non-event days and days with 
media articles or IBES research. The lack of reversal is inconsistent with the view that returns 
following retail trading reflect uninformed price pressure. 
5.2 Retail Order Imbalances and Stock Returns: Robustness 
 In the Internet Appendix (Table IA.1), we confirm that the evidence regarding the 
incremental informativeness of retail order imbalances around Seeking Alpha research is robust to 
several alternative methodological choices including: (1) measuring retail order imbalances using 
number of trades instead of share volume; (2) including in the sample firm-days with earnings 
news (earnings announcements or earning guidance); (3) adding firm fixed effects to the panel 
regression; and (4) using Fama-MacBeth regressions to estimate Equation (4).11  
  We explore whether the results are stable over time by estimating Equation (4) each month 
(Specification 3 in Table 5) and we plot the cumulative coefficients on Retail OIB×SA in Figure 
IA.1. We observe a jump in the second half of 2008, consistent with SA research being particularly 
valuable during the financial crisis, and a fairly stable and positive drift over the full sample period. 
To confirm that our results are not driven by the financial crisis period, we re-estimate the model 
after excluding the second half of 2008, and continue to find that the coefficient on Retail OIB × 
SA is statistically significant at a 5% level. 
5.3 Conditioning on Firm Size and Contributor Skill 
We examine whether Seeking Alpha research is more useful to retail investors for smaller 
stocks, which are known to be less informationally efficient. Specifically, we sort firms into two 
                                                            
11 In estimating Fama-Macbeth regressions, we limit the sample to days with at least 10 firms with Seeking Alpha 
research, and we calculate Newey West standard errors with 1, 5, and 10-day lags depending on the return horizon.  
18 
 
groups based on the median breakpoint of market capitalization (measured at the end of the 
previous year). We then repeat Specification 3 of Table 5 for each size group separately. Panel A 
of Table 6 reports the coefficient on Retail OIB×SA for each size subgroup. Among smaller stocks, 
the incremental profitability of retail order flow associated with Seeking Alpha research is 0.17 % 
over a 10-day holding period and statistically significant, compared to the 0.09% coefficient on 
Retail OIB (unreported). In contrast, among larger stocks the incremental informativeness of retail 
trading on days with Seeking Alpha research is considerably smaller. For example, the coefficient 
on Retail OIB over a 10-day horizon is 0.02% and the coefficient on Retail OIB×SA is 0.04%, 
neither of which is statistically different from zero. The findings suggest that the impact of Seeking 
Alpha research on the informativeness of retail trading is concentrated among smaller stocks. 
We suggest that retail investors will benefit more from research written by skilled Seeking 
Alpha contributors. Motivated by the idea that research by skilled individuals has greater market 
impact, we proxy for contributor skill by averaging the two-day (0, 1) absolute market-adjusted 
returns across the last five articles written by the contributor. We partition the sample into high 
versus low skill based on the median breakpoint of contributor skill, and we use indicator variables 
to separate event days where the fraction of articles written by high skill contributors is greater 
than 50% (High Skill) from those where it is less than or equal to 50% (Low Skill). 
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. The coefficients on Retail OIB×SA High 
Skill are highly significant, ranging from 0.11% for a one-day event window to 0.25% for the 10-
day window. In contrast, the coefficients on Retail OIB×SA Low Skill are small and statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, across all holding periods, the difference between the two estimates is 
significantly different from zero. The link between contributor skill and the extent to which retail 
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order imbalance is informative about future returns is consistent with more informed investment 
research leading to more informed retail trading.  
6. Seeking Alpha Research, Information Asymmetry, and Firm Liquidity 
 The evidence in the previous section suggests that Seeking Alpha disseminates investment 
information to retail investors who would not otherwise have access to the information. If 
crowdsourced investment research leads to a material reduction in the level of information 
asymmetry between institutions and individuals, then Seeking Alpha coverage should improve 
firm liquidity. In this section, we explore the broader implications of crowdsourced research for 
the firm’s information environment. Our approach focuses on exogenous shocks to Seeking Alpha 
coverage, and we study the effects of declines in coverage on measures of firm liquidity. 
6.1   Identifying Exogenous Shocks to Seeking Alpha Coverage 
 Studying the effects of Seeking Alpha coverage on firm liquidity is difficult because SA 
contributors choose which stocks to cover, and the choice to cover a stock is likely influenced by 
many firm characteristics including liquidity itself. We attempt to circumvent this challenge by 
identifying changes in Seeking Alpha coverage that are unlikely to be driven by firm 
characteristics. Specifically, our identification strategy focuses on the departure of a Seeking 
Alpha contributor from Seeking Alpha. Our underlying assumption is that when a contributor 
leaves the platform, the resulting decline in SA coverage of a firm is exogenous, i.e., unrelated to 
contributor’s expectation of how the firm’s environment will change. 
We define a Seeking Alpha contributor as departing if she covered at least five stocks in 
year t and no stocks subsequently. We require that contributors cover at least 5 stocks to reduce 
the likelihood that the departure is related to the fundamentals of the firms being covered. Of the 
5,756 Seeking Alpha contributors covering at least five stocks from 2004-2016, roughly 21% 
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(1,201) depart Seeking Alpha. The average departing contributor writes 22 articles for 16 unique 
stocks in the year prior to their departure. 
A firm experiences a Contributor Departureit in year t if at least 20% of its existing 
contributors leave in year t.12 We compare treated firms to candidate control firms that did not 
experience any departures using a difference-in-difference approach, and we require that both 
treated and controls firms have had coverage on Seeking Alpha for at least three years. Panel A of 
Table 7 reports summary statistics. The sample consists of 1,900 firms-years with contributor 
departures and 8,408 control firms-years. For both groups, we report the ΔLog (SA Coverage) in 
year t, defined as Log (1+SA Coverageit) – Log (1+SA Coverageit-1). We observe that control firms 
experience a roughly 14% increase in coverage on average, whereas firms experiencing contributor 
departure experience a roughly 20% decline in Seeking Alpha coverage. Firms experiencing 
contributor departure also tend to be slightly larger and more growth-oriented than control firms.  
If the choice to depart Seeking Alpha is unrelated to firm i’s informational environment, 
then we should not observe a decline in the coverage of firm i by remaining Seeking Alpha 
contributors, sell-side analysts, or the media. To help validate the assumption that Seeking Alpha 
contributor departures are exogenous, we examine the relation between contributor departures and 
changes in total SA coverage (SA Coverage), coverage by remaining SA contributors (Non-
Departing SA Coverage), sell-side analyst coverage (IBES Coverage), and media coverage (Media 
Coverage), the latter defined as the total number of traditional media articles in a year. 
We estimate the following panel regression: 
Δ(Log Coverageit) =  + β1ContributorDepartureit + βCharacteristicsi,t-1 + Time×Styleit + εit, (5) 
                                                            
12 Our results are similar if we change the cutoff for treated firms to 10%, 15%, or 25%.   
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where  denotes the change from year t-1 to t, and Characteristics is the vector of firm 
characteristics included in Equation (1), with each variable standardized to have zero mean and 
unit variance. Time×Styleit  is a vector of time × style indicator variables, where the style indicators 
are the 25 size and book-to-market groups as constructed in Daniel et al. (1997). Specifically, we 
first sort stocks into five quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints, and then within each size quintile, 
we further sort stocks into quintiles based on book-to-market. By including Time×Style indicator 
variables, we effectively follow the approach of Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) which matches 
treated firms to control firms in the same year, size quintile, and book-to-market quintile.13 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. 
In Specification 1 in Panel B of Table 7, we find that firms with Seeking Alpha contributor 
departures experience an economically and statistically significant 35% decline in SA coverage 
relative to matched control firms, validating the relevance of the Contributor Departure 
instrument. On the other hand, in Specification 2 we observe that treated firms experience a 
significant increase in coverage by non-departing SA contributors, inconsistent with the idea that 
departures are related to firm conditions. In addition, Specifications 3-4 show no significant change 
in IBES Coverage or Media Coverage following Seeking Alpha contributor departures. The 
evidence in Panel B helps validate the key assumption that contributor departures are exogenous 
to the information environment of the firm. 
6.2   Seeking Alpha Coverage and Firm Liquidity  
 We examine the relation between Seeking Alpha coverage and information asymmetry 
using the following panel regression: 
Δ Illiquidityit =  + β1ContributorDepartureit  + β2ΔLog (Non-Departing SA Coverageit) (6) 
                                                            
13 We find similar after including only time fixed effects. 
22 
 
+ β3ΔLog (IBES Coverageit) + β3ΔLog (Media Coverage) + βChar + Time×Styleit + εit. 
where Illiquidity is the percentage bid-ask spread (Bid-Ask) or the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio 
(Amihud Illiquidity), both measured in natural logs and at the monthly frequency (by averaging all 
daily observations in the month).14 We define ΔIlliquidityit as the difference between Illiquidityit 
and Illiquidityit-12. ΔContributor Departure, Characteristics, and Time×Style are defined as in 
Equation (5). ΔLog (Non-Departing SA Coverage), Δ Log (IBES Coverage), and Δ Log (Media 
Coverage) are proxies for changes in investor interest, defined in the Appendix. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm and time. 
 Specifications 1 and 2 of Table 8 report the difference-in-difference estimates for bid-ask 
spreads. The coefficient on Contributor Departure in Specification 1 indicates that relative to a 
portfolio of control firms matched on size, book-to-market, and year, firms with departing 
contributors experience a 3.45% increase in bid-ask spreads. The estimate is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and economically meaningful, translating into roughly 7% of the cross-
sectional standard deviation of the change in bid-ask spreads (50%). Specification 2 confirms that 
the results are robust to controlling for changes in investor interest and firm characteristics. 
Specifications 3 and 4 present analogous results for the Amihud illiquidity measure. After 
including all the controls, we find a difference-in-difference of 5.15% for the Amihud illiquidity 
measure. The change in illiquidity is roughly 6% of its cross-sectional standard deviation of 87%.  
 We next examine the relation between contributor departures and changes in firm liquidity 
in event time. Specifically, we re-estimate Specifications 2 and 4 of Table 8, varying the timing of 
Contributor Departure from Contributor Departurei,t-2 to Contributor Departurei,t+2. That is, we 
examine the results in event time from year -2 to +2, where year 0 is the baseline Specification 
                                                            
14 Results are similar if we aggregate illiquidity to an annual frequency.  
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reported in Table 8. Figure 2 reports the results for Bid-Ask and Amihud Illiquidity, respectively. 
We find no significant changes in Bid-Ask or Amihud Illiquidity in the two years prior to the event, 
in support of the parallels trends assumption. As shown in Table 8, both liquidity measures 
significantly decline in year 0 (the first year after the departure of Seeking Alpha contributors), 
and year 1. The two-year cumulative increase in Bid-Ask Spread (Amihud Illiquidity) is 4.84% 
(10.27%), which suggests that the decline in coverage has long-lived consequences for firm 
liquidity. Finally, we find that the change in illiquidity for both measures is small and statistically 
insignificant in event year 2.  
6.3   Conditioning on Firm Size, Retail Ownership, and Contributor Skill  
 In this section, we explore whether the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on liquidity 
depends on firm and contributor characteristics. The evidence in Table 6 is consistent with Seeking 
Alpha research being particularly valuable among smaller stocks and when the research is written 
by more skilled contributors. We suggest that the effect of contributor departure is more 
pronounced among stocks with greater retail ownership, where Seeking Alpha is likely a relatively 
more important information source, and when the departing contributor has greater skill.  
 Panel A of Table 9 examines whether the effect of departing contributors on liquidity varies 
with retail ownership by splitting the sample into two groups based on the median breakpoint of 
institutional ownership. Among firms with low institutional ownership, we estimate that firms with 
Contributor Departures experience a 5.26% increase in Bid-Ask Spreads and a 12.27% increase 
in the Amihud illiquidity measure, both of which are highly significant. In contrast, among firms 
in the bottom half of retail ownership, the coefficients on Contributor Departure for both 
illiquidity measures are statistically insignificant and economically small. Furthermore, the 
coefficient estimates across the two samples are significantly different from each other. These 
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findings support our conjecture that the effects of Seeking Alpha on information asymmetry are 
much stronger among stocks heavily owned by retail investors.   
 Panel B splits the sample into two groups based on the median breakpoint of market 
capitalization. We find consistent evidence of a liquidity decline for small firms. In particular, 
there is a marginally significant 3.95% increase in bid-ask spreads (p <0.10) and a highly 
significant 9.28% increase in Amihud illiquidity for small firms, with no evidence of a decline in 
liquidity for large firms. 
 Finally, Panel C sorts firms into two groups based on contributor skill as in Table 6. We 
find economically large and statistically significant increases in bid-ask spreads and Amihud 
liquidity when departing contributors have high skill. The results are weaker when departing 
contributors have low skill, and the differences in coefficient estimates between the two groups 
are significant at the 10% level. Collectively, the results in Table 9 confirm our conjecture that 
exogenous departures of Seeking Alpha contributors have a greater effect on firm liquidity for 
firms with greater retail ownership, smaller firms, and when a large fraction of departing 
contributors are highly skilled. 
7.   Conclusion  
Individual investors are typically at an information disadvantage relative to professional 
investors. In recent years, innovations in technology have helped spur the democratization of 
investment research, with the popular provider of informative crowdsourced research Seeking 
Alpha playing a central role (Chen et al., 2014). In this article, we explore the extent to which 
crowdsourced investment research has helped level the information playing field by studying the 
effects of Seeking Alpha investment research on investor decision-making and the information 
environment of the firm.  
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We confirm anecdotal evidence that Seeking Alpha research is geared towards retail 
investors, finding that Seeking Alpha coverage is significantly negatively related to institutional 
ownership and positively related to number of shareholders. We find significant increases in 
trading activity by retail investors on days with Seeking Alpha articles, with retail order imbalances 
being significantly related to the tone of research articles. More importantly, we find that Seeking 
Alpha research enhances the profitability of retail investor trades. In particular, the relation 
between retail order flow and future stock returns is roughly twice as strong on days with Seeking 
Alpha research articles. In contrast, we find no evidence that the informativeness of retail order 
flow strengthens on days when brokerage research is distributed, which is consistent with retail 
investors having more limited access to traditional Wall Street research. We also find no evidence 
that retail investors trade more profitably on days with media articles, highlighting the value of 
Seeking Alpha as a source of investment research. 
We find that the democratization of investment research has helped improve market 
liquidity, which is consistent with a reduction in information asymmetry between retail investors 
and institutional investors. Our identification strategy relies on the idea that the departure of a 
Seeking Alpha contributor from the platform represents a plausibly exogenous shock to Seeking 
Alpha research coverage. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that the bid-ask 
spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure increase by 2.4% and 5.5% in the year after 
contributor departures. These results are stronger among small firms, those with greater retail 
ownership, and when the departing contributors possess greater skill. 
We conclude that a recent technology-induced innovation, the crowdsourcing of 
investment research, has helped to level the informational playing field between retail and 
institutional investors. We acknowledge, however, that not all innovations in information access 
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work to level the information playing field. Many new sources of information target professional 
investors, and active portfolio managers expend tremendous resources to acquire investment 
information from Fin Tech companies (e.g. Grennan and Michaely, 2018). While Zhu (2018) finds 
evidence that these new sources of information help institutional investors better monitor company 
management, they may also work to increase information asymmetry between individuals and 
institutions. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions: 
A.1 Seeking Alpha Variables 
 SA Coverage – the number of unique Seeking Alpha contributors writing an opinion article  
for a firm during the calendar year (Source: Seeking Alpha). 
 SA Articles – the total number of Seeking Alpha opinion articles written for a firm during the 
calendar year (Source: Seeking Alpha). 
 Contributor Departure – an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has lost 20% or more of 
its existing coverage due to plausibly exogenous departures from Seeking Alpha. (Source: 
Seeking Alpha). 
o We consider dropped coverage for firm i in year t to be plausibly exogenous if 1) the 
departing contributor was covering at least five firms (including firm i) in year t-1 and 2) 
the contributor never issues research for any firms on Seeking Alpha at any point after year 
t-1. 
 Non-Departing SA Coverage – defined as SA Coverage less the total number of contributors 
who dropped coverage due to plausible exogenous departures (as defined above).  
 SA – a dummy variable equal to one if a Seeking Alpha opinion article was written about firm 
i on day t or day t-1 (Source: Seeking Alpha).  
 Percent Negative (Positive) – the average fraction of negative (positive) words across all 
single-ticker articles published on Seeking Alpha about firm i on day t. (Source: Seeking 
Alpha). The list of negative and positive words is taken from Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
 Short (Long) Position – a dummy variable equal to one if the author discloses a short (long) 
position about the company discussed in the article. This measure is average across all single-
ticker articles published about firm i on day t. 
 Contributor Skill – the two day absolute market-adjusted return averaged across the past five 
articles written by the contributor. (Source: Seeking Alpha/CRSP). 
A.2 Liquidity Measures 
 Retail Turnover – average daily retail turnover (i.e., retail share volume scaled by shares 
outstanding) during the calendar year. Retail trading is classified using the approach outlined 
in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017). (Source: TAQ and CRSP). 
 Percent Retail Turnover – retail share volume scaled by total share volume. Retail trading is 
classified using the approach outlined in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017). (Source: TAQ 
and CRSP). 
 Amihud - the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure computed using all daily data available in the 
calendar year.  
 Bid-Ask Spread – the average daily bid-ask spread computed as the difference between the 
(end of day) bid and ask price, divided by the midpoint. Winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. (Source: CRSP). 
A.3 Other Variables: 
 Size – the market capitalization computed as share prices times total shares outstanding at the 
end of the year (Source: CRSP). 
 Book-to-Market (BM) – the book-to-market ratio computed as the book value of equity during 
the calendar year scaled by the market capitalization at the end of the calendar year. Negative 
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values are deleted and positive values are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. (Source: 
CRSP/Compustat).  
 Volatility – the standard deviation of daily returns during the calendar year (Source: CRSP).  
 Age – the number of years since the Initial Public Offering (Source: Compustat). 
 Profitability – EBITDA scaled by book value of assets. Winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles (Source: Compustat). 
 Returnt-1, t-12 – the buy-and-hold gross return over the prior 12 months. Alternative holding 
periods are labelled analogously (Source: CRSP). 
 Institutional Ownership – the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutions at year end 
(Source: Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings S34). 
 Retail Ownership – 1 – Institutional Ownership. 
 Breadth of Ownership – the total number of common shareholders (Source: Compustat).  
 IBES Coverage – the number of unique brokerage houses issuing an earnings forecast for a 
firm during the calendar year (Source: IBES). 
 Media Coverage – the total number of media articles about a firm during the calendar year 
(Source: Factiva and Chen et al., 2014)). 
 IBES – an indicator variable equal to one if an IBES earnings forecast or IBES investment 
recommendation was issued for a firm on day t or day t-1 (Source: IBES). 
 Media – an indicator variable equal to one if a Media article was issued for a firm on day t or 
day t-1. (Source: Factiva and Chen et al., 2014). 
 Earnings Event – an indicator variable equal to one if earnings or earnings guidance is 
announced for the firm for day t or day t-1 (Source: IBES). 
 Retail OIB – retail buy volume less retail sell volume, scaled by total retail trading volume. 
Retail trading is classified using the approach outlined in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017), 
and trades are signed using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm (Source: TAQ).  
 Institutional OIB – the total (non-retail) share volume bought less the (non-retail) share volume 
sold, scaled by the total (non-retail) volume traded. Retail trading is classified using the 
approach outlined in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017), and trades are signed using the Lee 
and Ready (1991) algorithm (Source: TAQ). 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Seeking Alpha Research Article Sample 
The table reports information on Seeking Alpha research articles by year. The sample includes 156,513 single-ticker research articles written by 8,463 
unique contributors for which the referenced stock is available in the CRSP-Compustat merged database. Average in the bottom row denotes the average 
across years. 
Year 
Firms Covered 
by Seeking 
Alpha 
Fraction of 
CRSP/Compustat 
Universe with 
Coverage 
Seeking Alpha 
Articles 
Seeking Alpha 
Contributors 
Contributor-
Firm Pairs 
Articles per 
Contributor 
Articles per 
Contributor-
Firm Pair 
2005 240 5.04% 828 38 325 3.45 1.35 
2006 923 19.78% 3,130 245 2,192 3.39 2.37 
2007 1,437 31.16% 7,368 561 4,448 5.13 3.10 
2008 1,179 26.12% 5,120 704 3,321 4.34 2.82 
2009 1,235 28.95% 7,373 746 4,176 5.97 3.38 
2010 1,368 33.94% 7,007 743 4,209 5.12 3.08 
2011 1,338 34.53% 7,093 945 4,700 5.30 3.51 
2012 1,799 48.13% 18,905 1,582 11,278 10.51 6.27 
2013 2,322 64.32% 17,550 1,982 11,683 7.56 5.03 
2014 2,359 65.40% 21,498 2,087 13,260 9.11 5.62 
2015 2,607 69.76% 22,414 2,059 13,734 8.60 5.27 
2016 2,274 61.66% 18,722 2,015 10,982 8.23 4.83 
2017 2,217 62.22% 19,505 1,995 11,545 8.80 5.21 
Average 1,638 42.39% 12,039 1,208 7,373 6.58 3.99 
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Table 2: Determinants of Research Coverage by Seeking Alpha and IBES 
The table presents the results from the following panel regression: 
Coverageit =  +β1Institutional Ownershipi,t-1 +β2Breadth of Ownershipi,t-1 +βCharacteristics +Timet + εit.  
In Specifications 1 and 2, Coverage is defined as the natural log of 1 plus the total number of Seeking Alpha 
contributors who contribute at least one article for the stock during the calendar year (SA Coverage). In 
Specifications 3 and 4, it is the natural log of 1 plus the total number of brokerage firms that issue at least one 
earnings forecast for the stock during the calendar year (IBES Coverage). Institutional Ownershipi,t-1 is the 
percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors at the end of the previous year, and Breadth of 
Ownership is the number of common shareholders. Chari,t-1 is a vector of firm characteristic controls. Detailed 
descriptions of the variables are presented in Appendix A. The continuous variables with the exception of Return 
and Profitability are in natural logs, and all variables are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. All 
specifications include year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in 
parentheses below the corresponding coefficient estimates. The sample spans 2005-2017 and consists of 42,316 
firm-year observations with 5,849 unique firm clusters. 
  Log (SA Coverage) Log (IBES Coverage) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Institutional Ownership -0.18 -0.19 0.15 0.16 
 (-16.27) (-17.12) (15.50) (15.83) 
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 
 (3.13) (3.52) (-9.91) (-10.05) 
Log (Size) 0.35 0.31 0.67 0.66 
 (20.29) (15.85) (49.26) (46.84) 
Log (BM) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (-1.49) (-1.80) (-0.12) (-0.05) 
Log (Vol) 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.04 
(13.19) (13.06) (5.41) (4.92) 
Log (Turn) 0.08 0.06 0.31 0.30 
 (7.75) (5.90) (24.40) (24.21) 
Return 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
 (2.44) (2.29) (4.30) (4.19) 
Profitability 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (5.06) (5.45) (-6.71) (-6.96) 
Log (Media Coverage) 0.30 0.29 0.04 0.03 
 (25.46) (25.12) (7.26) (5.45) 
Log (IBES Coverage)  0.07 -0.04  
  (5.32) (-4.35)  
Log (SA Coverage)    0.03 
    (5.36) 
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time 
R-squared 45.69 45.81 76.79 76.85 
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Table 3: Seeking Alpha Research Coverage and Retail Investor Trading 
The table presents the results from the following daily panel regression:  
Retail Tradingit =  + β1SAit-1,t + β2IBESit-1,t + β3Mediait-1,t+ β4Char + Timet + Firmi + εit. 
In Specifications 1 and 2, Retail Tradingit denotes Retail Turnoverit, which is 1 plus the total retail trading volume 
in stock i on day t, scaled by stock i’s shares outstanding, measured in natural logs.  In Specifications 3 and 4, it 
denotes Percentage Retail Turnover, which is the total retail trading volume in stock i on day t, scaled by the 
aggregate trading volume in stock i on day t. SAit-1,t  is a dummy variable equal to one if Seeking Alpha issued a 
research report for firm i on day t or t-1. IBESit-1,t  is a dummy variable equal to one if IBES issued a research report 
for firm i on day t or t-1, and Mediait-1,t is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i was mentioned in traditional 
media article on day t or t-1. Char is a vector of firm characteristics measured at the end of the previous year. More 
details are available in the Appendix. All continuous independent variables are standardized to have mean zero and 
unit variance. Time and Firm indicate time (calendar day) and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. 
  Log ( Retail Turnover) Percent Retail Turnover 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
SA 0.15 0.13 1.09 0.62 
 (15.07) (24.09) (14.77) (20.39) 
IBES 0.09 0.08 0.30 0.06 
 (24.08) (48.98) (8.81) (5.81) 
Media 0.07 0.09 0.69 0.12 
 (5.86) (18.57) (7.35) (4.45) 
Log (Size) -0.10 -0.12 -2.91 -3.79 
 (-7.61) (-7.55) (-21.09) (-19.84) 
Log (BM) 0.01 -0.03 -0.24 -0.16 
(1.33) (-5.11) (-3.71) (-2.34) 
Inst Ownership -0.09 -0.01 -2.70 -0.95 
(-16.34) (-1.75) (-31.19) (-10.14) 
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.22 
 (-0.54) (1.30) (6.08) (1.65) 
Log (Vol) 0.10 0.07 0.66 0.46 
 (12.59) (10.82) (6.78) (6.15) 
Log (Turn) 0.17 0.12 0.70 0.22 
 (8.15) (12.93) (5.63) (2.23) 
Return 0.01 0.01 -0.54 -0.36 
 (2.04) (2.12) (-7.59) (-5.96) 
Profitability -0.03 0.00 -0.70 0.02 
 (-5.93) (0.17) (-11.94) (0.23) 
Log (IBES Coverage) 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.01 
 (1.00) (1.56) (-0.30) (0.08) 
Log (SA Coverage) 0.06 0.01 0.75 0.06 
 (9.90) (3.55) (14.06) (1.35) 
Log (Media Coverage) 0.03 0.02 0.50 0.22 
 (5.55) (5.44) (8.61) (5.34) 
Fixed Effects Time Time & Firm Time Time & Firm 
Observations 3,925,070 3,925,070 3,676,764 3,676,764 
R-squared 27.47 46.13 35.17 47.33 
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Table 4: Seeking Alpha Article Tone and Retail Investor Order Imbalance 
This table presents results from the following regression: 
Retail OIBi,t+x =  + β1SAit + β2SA× Percent Negit + β3SA× Percent Posit  + β4 SA×Short Positionit +  
β5SA×Long Positionit + β6IBESit+ β7IBES×Long+ β8IBES×Short + β9Mediait + 
β10Media× Percent Negt+ β11Media× Percent Posit + β12Inst OIBit + β13Chariy-1+ Timet + εit. 
Retail OIBi,t+x is defined as retail buy volume less retail sell volume, scaled by total retail trading volume for firm i 
on day t+x, where t is the event day and x varies from -3 to 3. SA is a dummy equal to one if Seeking Alpha published 
an article for firm i on day t; IBES and Media are defined analogously. Percent Negit (Posit ) is the average fraction 
of negative (positive) words across SA (or media) articles about company i on day t. SA Short (Long) Disclosureit 
equals one if the SA author is short (long) the stock, IBES Short equals one if the IBES report is negative (i.e., a 
recommendation downgrade or negative forecast revision), and IBES Long equals one if the IBES report is positive. 
Chars is a vector of firm characteristics that includes Turnover, Volatility, Size, and BM, all measured at the end of 
the previous year, and returns measured over the past week, month, and past two to seven months. More details are 
available in the Appendix. All continuous independent variables are in natural logs (with the exception of returns) 
and standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. Each regression includes time (calendar day) fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficient 
estimates. The sample includes 45,084 stock-day observations over the period 2007-2017. 
 Retail Order Imbalance by Event Day 
  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
SA 2.80% 4.35% 5.06% 6.52% 5.34% 2.39% 3.34% 
 (2.20) (4.05) (4.96) (6.06) (5.00) (1.77) (2.45) 
SA × Percent Negative -0.34% -0.26% -0.41% -1.17% -1.05% -0.40% -0.50% 
 (-1.62) (-1.37) (-2.18) (-5.52) (-4.97) (-1.89) (-2.38) 
SA × Percent Positive 0.33% -0.13% 0.03% 0.08% 0.35% 0.25% -0.15% 
 (1.29) (-0.58) (0.12) (0.31) (1.47) (0.92) (-0.55) 
SA × Short Position  -0.85% -3.08% -4.14% -6.75% -6.41% -4.33% -2.94% 
(-0.49) (-1.62) (-2.21) (-3.61) (-3.41) (-2.21) (-1.65) 
SA × Long Position  1.41% 0.59% 1.21% 3.83% 2.15% 1.52% 1.66% 
 (1.58) (0.69) (1.24) (3.91) (2.30) (1.67) (1.77) 
Media 1.45% 0.94% 2.41% 2.14% 2.23% 1.18% 0.29% 
 (1.39) (0.90) (2.37) (2.29) (2.37) (1.19) (0.29) 
Media × Percent Negative -0.15% -0.01% -0.19% -0.37% -0.82% -0.56% -0.60% 
 (-0.69) (-0.03) (-0.87) (-1.84) (-3.84) (-2.43) (-2.62) 
Media × Percent Positive -0.47% -0.06% -0.30% 0.12% 0.05% -0.36% 0.32% 
 (-2.29) (-0.32) (-1.48) (0.65) (0.27) (-1.77) (1.55) 
IBES 1.51% 2.61% 2.27% 1.00% 1.65% 1.14% 1.67% 
 (2.80) (4.39) (4.09) (2.06) (3.34) (2.10) (3.38) 
IBES × Long  1.83% -1.96% -0.29% 2.59% 1.63% 0.87% -0.62% 
 (1.86) (-2.04) (-0.31) (2.73) (1.69) (0.89) (-0.65) 
IBES × Short 1.38% 0.16% 0.75% 0.86% -1.89% -0.52% -0.51% 
 (1.44) (0.16) (0.74) (0.93) (-1.98) (-0.54) (-0.52) 
Institutional OIB  8.90% 8.90% 8.69% 8.64% 9.11% 8.85% 8.76% 
 (40.20) (38.99) (37.99) (38.63) (40.32) (39.21) (37.67) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time Time Time Time 
R-squared 2.24 2.24 2.21 2.19 2.23 2.25 2.21 
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Table 5: The Informativeness of Retail Trading following Seeking Alpha Research 
This table reports results from the panel regression: 
Retit,t+x =  + β1Retail OIBit  + β2Inst OIBit  + β3SAit +  β4Retail OIB×SAit + β5Inst OIBit ×SAit + β6Mediait + 
                  β7Retail OIB×Mediait + β5Inst OIBit ×SAit + β6Mediait +  β7Retail OIB×Mediait +  β8Inst OIB×Mediait + 
             β9IBESit +  β10Retail OIB×IBESit+  β11Inst OIB×IBESit  + β12Chariy-1+ Timet + εit 
Retit,t+x is the return on the stock from the close of day t to the close of day t+x. Retail OIBit is the total retail buy 
volume less total retail sell volume, scaled by total retail trading volume for stock i on day t, and Inst OIB is defined 
analogously. SAit is a dummy variable equal to one if a research report on firm i was published on Seeking Alpha on 
day t or t-1, and IBES and Media are defined analogously. RetailOIBit×SAit is an interaction terms that captures the 
incremental informativeness of retail order imbalances following Seeking Alpha articles. Chars is a vector of firm 
characteristics described in the Appendix. All continuous variables are standardized and all regressions include time 
(calendar day) fixed effects. Standard errors are double clustered by date and firm, and t-statistics are reported below 
each estimate. The sample spans 2007-2017 and is comprised of 4,102,574 firm-day observations. 
  Holding Period 
  [1]  [1,5] [1,10] 
Retail OIB 0.02% 0.06% 0.09% 
 (10.85) (12.80) (10.60) 
Institutional OIB -0.04% -0.04% -0.03% 
 (-9.88) (-4.93) (-2.92) 
SA 0.02% 0.04% 0.04% 
 (2.26) (1.28) (0.71) 
Retail OIB × SA   0.04% 0.04% 0.09% 
 (4.19) (1.49) (2.58) 
Institutional OIB × SA 0.02% 0.02% -0.01% 
 (2.02) (0.62) (-0.13) 
Media -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 
(-1.38) (-0.29) (-0.15) 
Retail OIB × Media   0.02% 0.04% 0.03% 
 (1.24) (1.24) (0.85) 
Institutional OIB × Media 0.07% 0.11% 0.09% 
 (4.31) (3.21) (2.40) 
IBES -0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 
 (-1.05) (-0.08) (0.12) 
Retail OIB × IBES   0.00% 0.00% -0.02% 
 (-0.24) (-0.31) (-0.90) 
Institutional OIB × IBES 0.02% 0.01% 0.04% 
 (2.25) (0.54) (1.96) 
Retw-1 -0.02% -0.09% -0.12% 
 (-4.01) (-3.77) (-3.31) 
Retm-1 -0.01% -0.04% -0.04% 
 (-1.87) (-1.23) (-0.72) 
Retm-7,m-2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (-0.50) (-0.10) (0.04) 
Turnoverm-1 -0.01% -0.06% -0.12% 
 (-2.37) (-2.27) (-2.52) 
Volatilitym-1 0.01% 0.06% 0.09% 
 (1.84) (1.50) (1.22) 
Log (Size) 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% 
 (-0.62) (-0.32) (-0.24) 
Log (BM) 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 
 (0.39) (0.50) (0.52) Fixed Effects Time Time Time 
R-squared  16.59% 15.81% 15.24% 
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Table 6. Retail Trading Informativeness Following Seeking Alpha Research: Size and Contributor Skill 
The table repeats the analysis in Table 5 after partitioning the sample based on firm size and contributor skill. In Panel 
A, the sample is split into Small and Large firms based on median market capitalization at the end of the previous 
year. In Panel B, the research article sample is split into High and Low Skill contributors based on the median average 
two-day absolute market-adjusted return across the last five articles written by the contributor. Standard errors are 
double clustered by date and firm, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The sample spans 
2007-2017. 
 Coefficient on Retail OIB×SA 
Panel A: Firm Size 
 Holding Period: 
 [1]  [1,5] [1,10] 
Small Firms 0.09% 0.10% 0.17% 
 (4.49) (2.33) (2.78) 
Large Firms 0.01% -0.01% 0.04% 
 (0.56) (-0.42) (1.08) 
Difference in Coefficients 0.08% 0.12% 0.14% 
  (3.62) (2.10) (1.95) 
    
Panel B: Contributor Skill 
 Holding Period: 
 [1]  [1,5] [1,10] 
High Skill 0.11% 0.14% 0.25% 
 (4.22) (2.70) (2.77) 
Low Skill 0.01% -0.08% -0.07% 
 (0.71) (-1.87) (-1.24) 
Difference in Coefficients 0.09% 0.22% 0.32% 
 (3.05) (3.33) (2.91) 
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Table 7: Departing Seeking Alpha Contributors: Validity Tests 
The table reports the effects of departing Seeking Alpha contributors on research coverage. Firms experience 
Contributor Departure if at least 20% of the firm’s existing contributors depart Seeking Alpha in the previous year. 
Control firms are firms with no departing Seeking Alpha contributors. Panel A reports univariate statistics for 
coverage and firm characteristics. SA Coverage is the total number of unique Seeking Alpha contributors writing 
at least one article for the stock during the calendar year, and ΔLog (SA Coverage) is defined as Log(1+SA 
Coverageit)–Log(1+SA Coverageit-1). Panel B presents the estimates from regressing measures of changes in 
different measures of research Coverage on a Contributor Departure indicator variable. We include as controls a 
number of firm characteristics described in the appendix. The regressions also include time × style fixed effects, 
where the style dummies capture the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios, which effectively matches treated firms 
to control firms in the same year and size and book-to-market quintiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
time, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The sample covers 2005-2017. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Control Firms and  Contributor Departure Firms 
 Observations 
Percent Change 
Coverage Log (Size) Log (MB) 
Control Firms  8,408 14.06% 13.60 0.78 
Contributor Departure Firms  1,900 -19.61% 14.50 1.07 
     
Panel B: Regression of Changes in Coverage on Contributor Departure 
  
Δ (Log SA 
Coverage ) 
Δ (Log Non-
Depart. SA 
Coverage) 
 Δ (Log IBES 
Coverage ) 
 Δ (Log Media 
Coverage ) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Contributor Departure  -35.40% 6.31% -0.22% 4.02% 
  (-16.15) (2.60)  (-0.59) (1.33) Δ (Log Non-Depart. SA Coverage)   1.44% 4.94% (6.57) (3.79) 
 Δ (Log IBES Coverage ) 9.50% 9.63% (0.01) 
(5.70) (5.70) (0.36) 
 Δ (Log Media Coverage ) 11.18% 10.85% 0.22%  
 (7.69) (7.30) (0.36)  
Log (Size) 1.90% 0.57% 9.85% 12.38% 
 (0.74) (0.21) (6.03) (3.13) 
Log (BM) -3.10% -3.09% -0.21% -0.58% 
 (-2.22) (-2.19) (-0.20) (-0.77) 
Inst Ownership 0.18% 0.78% 1.40% -1.56% 
 (0.12) (0.49) (3.43)  (-1.50) 
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.65% 0.67% -1.01% 1.15% 
 (0.97) (0.92)  (-4.93) (1.48) 
Log (Vol) 1.09% 0.77% 1.74% 4.44% 
 (0.65) (0.46) (2.61) (2.48) 
Log (Turn) -2.54% -3.04% 3.98% -1.03% 
  (-1.82)  (-1.96) (2.66)  (-1.68) 
Return 1.78% 1.79% 1.82% 0.11% 
 (2.01) (1.95) (5.41) (0.21) 
Profitability 1.57% 1.51% 0.19% 0.28% 
 (1.47) (1.39) (0.45) (0.41) 
Log (IBES Coverage) 2.93% 3.08% -16.65% 1.43% 
 (3.03) (3.74)  (-9.73) (1.06) 
Log (Media Coverage) 4.52% 3.66% 0.07% -21.58% 
 (3.58) (3.19) (0.13)  (-5.08) Fixed Effects Time × Style Time × Style Time × Style Time × Style 
Total R-squared 16.01% 12.23% 18.21% 29.30% 
 
38 
 
Table 8: Departing Seeking Alpha Contributors: Effects on Firm Liquidity 
The table reports the results from the following panel regression: 
ΔIlliquidit =  +β1ContrDepartit +β2ΔLog(Non-Depart SA Covit) +β3ΔLog (IBESCovit) +βChars +Tm×Styleit +εit, 
where Illiquidit is the percentage bid-ask spread (Bid-Ask) in Specifications 1 and 2 and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio (Amihud) in Specifications 3 and 4, both measured in natural logs. Both measures are calculated monthly using 
daily averages; change is defined as Illiquidit - Illiquidit-12. Firm i experiences contributor departure (ContrDepartit) 
if at least 20% of its existing contributors depart Seeking Alpha (i.e. issue research for at least five stocks in the 
calendar year prior to month t, and for no stocks in calendar year 0 onwards). Non-Depart SA Covit (IBESCovit) 
denotes the number of unique non-departing Seeking Alpha contributors (brokerage firms in IBES) that issue at least 
one research report research for the stock during calendar year t. Chars denotes a vector of firm characteristics that 
is defined in the Appendix. Each regression includes time×style fixed effects (Tm×Styleit) based on the 25 size and 
book-to-market portfolios. Standard errors are clustered by firm and month, and t-statistics are reported below each 
estimate. The sample period spans 2005-2017 and is comprised of 123,645 firm-month observations. 
 Δ Log (Bid-Ask) Δ Log (Amihud) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Contributor Departure 3.45% 2.15% 7.51% 5.15% 
 (2.98) (2.47) (7.02) (5.72) 
Log (Size)  -7.82%  -16.17% 
   (-1.87)   (-3.69) 
Log (BM)  1.28%  1.86% 
   (1.57)   (1.09) 
Institutional Ownership  -0.42%  -4.71% 
   (-0.46)   (-3.07) 
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.04% -0.16% 
(0.12)  (-0.28) 
Log (Vol) -5.68% -16.09% 
   (-2.79)   (-4.08) 
Log (Turnover)  6.06%  20.95% 
  (6.57)  (10.00) 
Return  -13.95%  -27.62% 
   (-10.57)   (-10.56) 
Profitability  -0.45%  -1.74% 
   (-0.69)   (-2.17) 
Log (IBES Coverage)  3.54%  -0.38% 
  (2.59)   (-0.25) 
Δ (Log Non-Departing SA Coverage )  0.54%  0.63% 
  (0.72)  (0.80) 
Δ (Log IBES Coverage )  -1.95%  -7.73% 
   (-3.43)   (-7.05) 
Δ (Log Media Coverage )  -11.77%  -28.02% 
   (-3.91)   (-6.48) 
Fixed Effects Time × Style Time × Style Time × Style Time × Style 
R-squared 19.92% 27.86% 22.54% 34.60% 
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Table 9: Departing Seeking Alpha Contributors and Liquidity: Ownership, Size, and Contributor Skill 
The table repeats the analysis in Table 8 after partitioning the sample based on institutional ownership, firm size, 
and contributor skill. In Panel A (B), the sample of firms is split into High and Low Institutional Ownership (Size) 
using the median value at the end of the previous year. In Panel C, the sample split is based on whether the fraction 
of departing contributors with high skill is greater than 50%. Contributor skill is measured as the average two-day 
market-adjusted return across the last five articles written by the contributor. For each partition, we estimate the 
panel regression:  
ΔIlliquidit =  +β1ContrDepartit +β2ΔLog(Non-Depart SA Covit)+β3ΔLog (IBESCovit) +βChars +Tm×Styleit +εit, 
where Illiquidit is the percentage bid-ask spread (Bid-Ask) or the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (Amihud), both 
measured in natural logs. The illiquidity measures are calculated monthly using daily averages, and ΔIlliquidit is 
the illiquidity measure in month t less the measure in month t-12. Firms are classified as experiencing contributor 
departure (ContrDepartit) if at least 20% of firm i’s existing contributors depart Seeking Alpha (i.e. issue research 
for at least five stocks in calendar years -3 through -1 before month t, and for no stocks in calendar year 0 onwards). 
Non-DepartSACovit (IBESCovit) denotes the number of unique non-departing Seeking Alpha contributors 
(brokerage firms in IBES) that issue at least one research report research for stock during calendar year 0. Chars 
denotes a vector of firm characteristics that is defined in the Appendix. Each regression includes time×style fixed 
effects (Tm×Styleit) based on the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
time, and t-statistics are reported below each estimate. The sample period spans 2005-2017 and is comprised of 
123,645 firm-month observations. 
 Coefficient on Contributor Departure 
Panel A: Sorts on Institutional Ownership 
 Δ Log (Bid-Ask) Δ Log (Amihud) 
Low Institutional Ownership 5.26 12.27 
 (3.08) (5.40) 
High Institutional Ownership -0.06 -0.25 
 (-0.07)  (-0.27) 
Difference in Coefficients 5.32 12.52 
  (2.68) (4.35) 
   
Panel B: Sorts on Firm Size 
 Δ Log (Bid-Ask) Δ Log (Amihud) 
Small Firms 3.95 9.28 
 (1.67) (4.99) 
Large Firm 0.60 0.95 
 (0.46) (0.94) 
Difference in Coefficients 3.35 8.33 
  (1.04) (3.47) 
   
Panel C: Sorts on Departing Contributor Skill 
 Δ Log (Bid-Ask) Δ Log (Amihud) 
High Skill 3.95 7.25 
 (3.54) (5.21) 
Low Skill 0.61 3.43 
 (0.66) (3.19) 
Difference in Coefficients 3.34 3.82 
  (2.26) (1.90) 
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Figure 1. Informativeness of Retail Trading over Longer Horizons 
This figure plots results from the panel regression of the form: 
Retit,t+x =  + β1Retail OIBit  + β2Inst OIBit  + β3SAit +  β4Retail OIB×SAit + β5Inst OIBit ×SAit + β6Mediait 
+  β7Retail OIB×Mediait + β5Inst OIBit ×SAit + β6Mediait +  β7Retail OIB×Mediait +  β8Inst OIB×Mediait + β9IBESit +  
β10Retail OIB×IBESit+  β11Inst OIB×IBESit  + β12Chariy-1+ Timet + εit 
Retit,t+x is the return on the stock from the close of day t to the close of day t+x. The figure reports estimates where x 
equals 10, 20, 40, or 60 days. All variables are defined as in Table 5. The figure plots the coefficient estimates around 
No Event (i.e., β1), Seeking Alpha research (β1+ β4), Media articles (β1+ β7), and IBES research (β1+ β11). The sample 
spans 2007-2017 and is comprised of 4,102,574 firm-day observations. 
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Panel A: Dependent Variable is ΔLog(Bid-Ask) 
 
  
Panel B: Dependent Variable is ΔLog(Amihud) 
 
  
Figure 2. Dropped Seeking Alpha Coverage and Measures of Liquidity in Event Time 
The figure repeats the analysis in Specifications 2 and 4 of Table 8 for different years around the event. We vary the 
timing of Contributor Departure from Contributor Departurei,t-2 to Contributor Departurei,t+2, where Contributor 
Departurei,t (i.e., event year = 0) represents the baseline results reported in Table 8. The vertical bars show the 
coefficients on Contributor Departure and the lines show the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. 
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Table IA.1 The Informativeness of Retail Trading Following Seeking Alpha Research: Robustness Checks 
The table repeats the analysis in Table 5 in alternative ways for robustness. The regressions include the full set of 
controls from Table 5, but for brevity, only the coefficient on RetailOIB×SA is tabulated. Specification 1 reports the 
Baseline Results from Table 5 as a benchmark. CRSP Midpoint refers to calculating returns using bid-ask midquote 
rather than closing transaction prices. Trades Instead of Volume refers to measuring retail order imbalances using 
the number of trades instead of trading volume. Add Earnings Events includes firm-days with earnings news on day 
t or t-1 (i.e., earnings announcements, earning guidance). Add Firm Fixed Effects add firm dummies to the baseline 
specification reported in Table 5. Fama MacBeth switches from a panel regression to a Fama MacBeth approach to 
estimate the coefficients. Specifically, we estimate the above equation cross-sectionally each day for which at least 
10 firms had Seeking Alpha Articles (i.e. SAit = 1). We then average the coefficients across regressions and calculate 
standard errors using Newey West with 1, 5, and 10 lags.  
 Coefficient on Retail OIB × SA 
 Holding Period 
 [1] [1,5] [1,10] 
Baseline Results 0.04% 0.04% 0.09% 
 (4.19) (1.49) (2.58) 
Trades Instead of Volume 0.07% 0.03% 0.08% 
 (5.94) (1.10) (2.04) 
Add Earnings Events 0.04% 0.04% 0.09% 
 (3.79) (1.46) (2.62) 
Add Firm Fixed Effects 0.05% 0.04% 0.10% 
 (4.21) (1.60) (2.79) 
Fama-Macbeth (>= 10 SA Obs.) 0.05% 0.06% 0.11% 
 (3.83) (1.59) (2.49) 
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Figure IA.1: The Informativeness of Retail Trading Following Seeking Alpha Research over Time 
Each month, we estimate the following panel regression: 
Retit,t+10 =  + β1Retail OIBit  + β2Inst OIBit  + β3SAit +  β4Retail OIB×SAit + β5Inst OIBit ×SAit +  
β6Mediait +  β7Retail OIB×Mediait + β5Inst OIBit ×SAit + β6Mediait +  β7Retail OIB×Mediait + 
 β8Inst OIB×Mediait + β9IBESit +  β10Retail OIB×IBESit+  β11Inst OIB×IBESit  + β12Chariy-1+ Timet + εit 
The regression is identical to Specification 3 of Table 5 except that the regression is estimated separately each month. 
The figure plots the cumulative coefficient on Retail OIB * SA over the full-sample period. 
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